n 


< r-.  r"'  A OV 

;D  u\n  • 


Juiitrial  Settlement 


nf  Sntrntalinnal  Siaputra 


No.  5 


1. 


2. 


An  ^International  (Court  nf  Jnatire  the 
Next  Step 

bg  (Senrge  Graftrm  fflUantt,  ?Jlj-  S-.  5HC.  0. 


JUrnfeaaor  nf  ilnlmtafinnal  Siam  Sartmrti  Httiuaratlij. 
Srrturrr  nn  Sntrrnalinnal  Saw  II - S'.  Sfaual 
Glar  (College  anil  Braura  Uniurrsttu 


Salient  uHroughta — Jluiurtal  Settlement 
(Conference 


fag  aHjenimre  Marburg 


3.  Heoolntiona  ®hirfc  National  Peace 
(Congreaa 

AUGUST,  1911 


Published  Quarterly  by  American  Society  for  Judicial  Settlement 
of  International  Disnutes. 

KZ 

Salt!  4850 
.J835 
no. 5 


Entered  as  seconds 
the  Postoffice  at  Bi 
July  16,  1834. 


21,  1910.  at 
r the  Act  of 


An  international  (Court  of  Iluatire  tlje 
Next  #tep 

©?orgr  ©rafton  Mtlamt 


International  arbitration  has  satisfactorily 
settled  many  disputes  between  States.  No 
one  familiar  with  the  history  of  international 
arbitration  would  deny  that  it  has  contributed 
much  to  the  maintenance  of  world  peace,  yet 
the  ancient  idea  of  arbitration  still  influences 
the  minds  of  men.  The  idea  of  Seneca  quoted 
by  Grotius  that  “it  would  be  better  to  submit 
a good  cause  to  a judge  rather  than  to  an 
arbitrator”  has  not  disappeared.  The  early 
idea  that  the  arbitrator  looked  to  what  might 
be  called  expediency  rather  than  to  law  and 
justice  has  naturally  prevailed  among  the  fol- 
lowers of  Aristotle,  who  are  many.  To 
some,  arbitration  is  simply  a method  of  reach- 
ing a compromise  to  which  the  parties  will 
submit. 

While  in  many  cases  the  decisions  of  arbi- 
tral courts  have  been  in  accord  with  justice 


3 


yet  to  those  hoping  for  the  reign  of  right 
among  nations,  such  decisions  have  often  been 
disappointing.  The  arbitrators  have  seemed 
to  pay  more  attention  to  questions  of  policy 
than  to  the  rights  of  the  parties,  with  the  re- 
sult that  the  decisions  of  courts  of  arbitration 
have  from  time  to  time  followed  the  line  of 
practicable  compromises.  In  the  earlier  days 
of  international  arbitration  the  aim  was  indeed 
to  reach  a compromise  upon  which  it  might 
be  possible  to  bring  to  an  end  the  dispute 
between  states.  The  same  aim  has  prevailed 
in  some  of  the  later  arbitrations  and  the 
Compromis  or  preliminary  agreement,  setting 
forth  the  subject  of  the  dispute  and  also  “all 
the  conditions  on  which  the  parties  are 
agreed,”  has  been  in  such  form  as  to  make 
compromise  the  only  means  of  settlement.  As 
Mr.  Elihu  Root  recently  said  of  ordinary 
arbitration,  it  “too  often  means  a compromise 
or  settlement  in  a diplomatic  way  by  the  arbi- 
trators.” 

Even  such  a settlement  of  international 
disputes  is  a great  advance  upon  the  settle- 


4 


ment  through  the  issue  of  battle.  War  may 
not  always  favor  the  stronger  but  the  belief 
that  it  will  in  a majority  of  cases  be  found  on 
the  side  of  the  stronger  battalions  and  navies 
is  evident  from  the  present  competition  in  the 
increase  of  armaments.  The  doctrine  that 
might  makes  right  has  not  been  wholly  sup- 
planted in  international  affairs,  though  men 
are  looking  and  longing  for  something  better. 

Through  temporary  diplomatic  missions  in 
the  early  days  some  of  the  matters  causing 
friction  among  states  were  adjusted,  but  the 
diplomats  sent  on  these  temporary  missions 
were  regarded  with  suspicion  and  the  office 
was  not  accepted  gladly.  From  the  fourteenth 
century,  when  the  office  seemed  to  have 
gained  in  favor  and  permanency,  to  the 
present  time,  when  the  ambassadorial  func- 
tion is  one  of  the  highest  dignity  and  repute, 
the  accomplishments  of  diplomacy  in  avoiding 
and  in  settling  differences  among  the  states 
has  been  most  beneficent.  It  must  be  frankly 
admitted  that  there  are  some  differences  for 
which  diplomacy  does  not  afford  a solvent. 


5 


Such  differences  were  till  the  beginning 
of  the  twentieth  century  sometimes  referred 
to  arbitrators,  sometimes  to  specially  consti- 
tuted courts  of  arbitration,  or  in  early  times 
to  certain  officials  or  classes,  as  Plutarch  says 
of  the  office  of  the  Roman  Feciales  that  it  was 
to  prevent  the  “appeal  to  arms  till  all  hope  of 
obtaining  a righteous  settlement  had  been 
destroyed.” 

Good  offices  and  mediation  were  often 
offered  and  accepted.  Each  party  to  the  con- 
troversy might  regard,  and  usually  did  re- 
gard, such  methods  as  simply  expedients  to 
which  they  resorted  from  reasons  of  policy. 

A step  forward  was  taken  in  1899,  probably 
a greater  step  than  was  realized,  when  pro- 
vision was  made  for  the  institution  known  as 
an  “International  Commission  of  Inquiry,  to 
facilitate  a solution”  of  differences  arising 
upon  points  of  fact  “by  elucidating  the  facts 
by  means  of  an  impartial  and  conscientious 
investigation.”  The  existence  of  such  a means 
of  investigation  proved  of  greatest  value  at 
the  time  of  the  strained  relations  between 


6 


Great  Britain  and  Russia  consequent  upon 
the  firing  upon  the  British  fishing  vessels  off 
the  Dogger  Banks  in  the  North  Sea  by  the 
Russian  fleet,  bound  to  attack  the  Japanese 
fleet  in  1904.  The  finding  of  this  commission, 
sitting  as  a kind  of  international  grand  jury, 
was  accepted  by  both  parties  and  further 
trouble  was  averted. 

The  institution  of  the  “Permanent  Court  of 
Arbitration”  in  1899  “with  the  object  of  facili- 
tating an  immediate  recourse  to  arbitration  for 
international  differences,  which  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  settle  by  diplomacy,”  was  for  a 
time  lightly  regarded  by  many  statesmen. 
Following  the  lead  of  the  United  States  in 
1902,  many  cases  have  been  referred  to  this 
Court.  Their  number  and  varied  nature  give 
evidence  of  the  place  which  the  court  holds 
even  though  admittedly  defective  in  some  re- 
spects. In  procedure  and  in  other  respects, 
the  provisions  for  this  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Arbitration  and  for  the  Commis- 
sion of  Inquiry  were  improved  and  elaborated 
at  the  Second  Hague  Peace  Conference  in 
1907. 


7 


In  1907  also  a draft  convention  proposed  the 
creation  of  a Court  of  Arbitral  Justice  “freely 
and  easily  accessible,  composed  of  judges 
representing  the  various  judicial  systems  of 
the  world  and  capable  of  insuring  continuity 
in  arbitral  jurisprudence.”  Mr.  Knox,  Secre- 
tary of  State  of  the  United  States  in  an  identic 
note  of  October  18,  1909,  suggested  to  the 
Powers  the  possibility  of  bringing  this  court 
into  being,  and  mentioning  that  in  making  the 
suggestion  he  was  influenced  by  the  daily 
practice  and  procedure  of  the  “national  courts 
of  justice”  of  the  United  States,  “where  one 
and  the  same  judge  administers  law  and  equity, 
admiralty  and  prize,  which  under  its  system  of 
procedure  are  different  systems  of  law.”  It 
was  proposed  that  this  court  should  be  “com- 
petent to  deal  with  all  cases  submitted  to  it,  in 
virtue  either  of  a general  undertaking  to  have 
recourse  to  arbitration  or  of  a special  agree- 
ment.” This  court  was  to  be  of  a more  per- 
manent character  than  that  under  the  Con- 
vention for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  Inter- 
national Disputes. 


8 


The  course  of  development  in  the  method 
of  settling  international  differences  from  the 
method  of  war  to  that  of  arbitration  in  some 
of  its  forms  has  shown  that  a new  sanction  is 
taking  the  place  of  the  sanction  of  force. 
States  have  without  protest  accepted  the  de- 
cisions of  arbitrators  to  whom  they  have 
agreed  to  leave  their  differences.  The  sense 
of  fairness  has  even  entered  the  field  of  war 
and  the  significance  of  the  old  maxims  silent 
leges  inter  arma,  and  “all  things  are  fair  in 
war”  have  greatly  changed.  Extended  pro- 
vision is  made  in  the  Hague  Conventions  of 
1907  for  the  regulation  of  the  conduct  of  war- 
fare in  accord  with  “the  laws  of  humanity 
and  the  requirements  of  the  public  con- 
science.” This  recognition  that  a state  must 
give  heed  to  the  “public  conscience”  even  in 
the  time  of  war  is  of  recent  origin  and  hardly 
now  fully  understood,  yet  the  sanction  of  the 
“public  conscience”  is  daily  becoming  more 
powerful  in  determining  international  conduct. 
The  public  to  which  appeal  was  formerly 
made  was  narrow  and  prejudiced,  it  is  now 


9 


world  wide  and  swayed  by  principles  of 
fundamental  right. 

A court  that  is  to  decide  questions  between 
nations  must  have  this  sanction  of  the  “public 
conscience,”  which  with  the  elimination  of 
time  and  space  in  the  transmission  of  news 
has  now  become  an  international  public  con- 
science. Decisions  by  arbitration  which  may 
compose  differences  by  compromises  cannot 
as  the  public  conscience  develops  receive  the 
necessary  sanction.  It  will  be  needful  not 
merely  that  states  submit  to  decisions  because 
they  have  given  prior  agreement  to  that  effect. 
The  justice  of  these  decisions  must  appeal  to 
this  wider  “public  conscience.”  There  is  not 
the  reluctance  to  criticise  the  decisions  of  an 
international  court  which  might  be  essential 
as  regards  the  decisions  of  a national  court. 
The  broad  world  well-being  can  only  be  se- 
cured by  the  fullest  criticism.  There  has  been 
criticism  of  the  contrast  between  the  action 
of  the  Powers  at  the  time  of  the  settlement  of 
the  Chinese  indemnity  in  1902  following  mili- 
tary intervention  in  the  Chinese  Empire  in 
consequence  of  the  Boxer  uprising  in  1901, 


10 


and  the  settlement  of  the  claims  against  Venez- 
uela which  led  to  the  intervention  of  several 
Powers  in  that  state  in  1902.  The  settlement 
of  the  claims  against  China  was  by  diplomatic 
negotiations  and  distinction  was  not  made  in 
favor  of  those  states  which  had  used  military 
force  against  China.  The  settlement  of  the 
claims  against  Venezuela  by  the  Permanent 
Court  of  Arbitration  gave  preference  to  the 
states  which  had  used  force.  The  possible 
bearing  of  such  a decision  was  brought  to  the 
attention  of  the  court  at  The  Hague  in  the 
arguments  of  the  counsel  and  has  been  the 
subject  of  much  comment.  The  able  repre- 
sentatives of  France,  Renault,  Clunet  and 
Fromageot,  maintained  in  their  argument 
that, 

“If,  according  to  the  contention  of  the  allied 
powers,  it  be  recognized  by  a judicial  de- 
cision, whose  authority  will  be  unquestionable, 
that  the  mere  fact  by  one  or  more  States  of 
exerting  a violent  coercion  against  another 
state  affords  to  the  promoters  of  the  said 
violence  a privileged  situation  as  against  the 
states  standing  outside  the  conflict,  it  may  be 


11 


said  that  it  involves  the  early  end  of  any  regu- 
lar and  patient  transaction  as  well  as  of  any 
pacific  arrangement  for  such  states  whose 
solvency  is  doubtful.  The  meetings  of  tri- 
bunals of  arbitration,  for  which  public  opinion 
is  now  calling  with  the  utmost  eagerness, 
would  then  become  more  and  more  scarce.” 

‘‘The  denial  of  any  preferential  treatment 
to  the  blockading  powers,  thus  justified  by 
the  principles  of  law  and  equity,  by  inter- 
national practice,  is  still  recommended  by  the 
serious  consequences  that  would  result  from 
a contrary  decision.  Such  a contrary  decision 
would  be  of  a nature  to  incite  to  violence 
against  states  of  doubtful  solvency,  and  that 
would  be  manifestly  inconsistent  with  the 
letter  and  spirit  of  the  provisions  agreed  by 
the  powers  in  1899,  as  well  as  with  the  general 
interest  of  humanity.”  (Penfield’s  Report,  pp. 
886,  891.) 

Mr.  McVeagh,  the  counsel  for  the  United 
States  in  this  case,  in  arguing  against  prefer- 
ential treatment  of  states  which  had  used 
force  said, 


12 


“I  desire  to  emphasize  at  the  very  outset  of 
my  argument  the  story  of  the  creation  of  this 
court  and  the  ethical  quality  which  permeated 
all  the  proceedings  culminating  in  its  crea- 
tion; and  our  desire  to  do  so  is  great  because 
we  believe  such  emphasis  is  indispensable  to 
lifting  the  spirit  of  our  discussions  and  of  your 
deliberations  above  the  spirit  of  martial 
strength  and  the  willingness  to  make  aggres- 
sive war,  which  is  a natural  consequence  of 
such  strength,  into  the  higher  and  serener  air 
where  equality  is  always  recognized  as  equity, 
the  air  of  that  international  forbearance  and 
long-suffering  which  seeks  for  righteousness 
and,  if  possible,  for  peace  in  all  the  relations 
of  all  the  peoples  of  the  earth.”  (Ibid.,  p. 

I I2l). 

Whether,  considering  the  technicalities  of 
this  case,  the  decision  of  the  court  was  or 
was  not  just,  it  was  believed  in  some  quarters 
that  the  award  did  not  give  due  weight  to 
these  arguments  but  placed  a premium  upon 
the  use  of  force  and  that  accordingly  there 
followed  a period  of  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
court  and  cases  were  therefore  withheld  from 


13 


its  consideration.  If  this  was  so,  the  number 
of  cases  referred  to  the  court  at  The  Hague 
since  the  beginning  of  1909  is  an  evidence  of 
the  return  of  confidence  in  its  method  of  pro- 
cedure since  the  revision  in  1907  of  the  Con- 
vention under  which  the  court  acts. 

Admitting  the  value  of  the  courts  of  arbitra- 
tion and  the  possibility  that  this  value  may  be 
increased  through  improvement  in  a court 
comparatively  recently  established,  there  still 
remains  in  the  nature  of  arbitration  that  which 
makes  it  only  in  part  fitted  for  securing  in  in- 
ternational relations  the  results  analogous  to 
those  secured  by  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  in  the  decision  of  the  matters  within  its 
jurisdiction.  As  mentioned  by  Secretary 
Knox,  the  so-called  Court  of  Judicial  Arbitra- 
tion, or  Arbitral  Justice  approaches  more 
nearly  to  the  model  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court.  There  seems,  however,  to  be 
a certain  inconsistency  in  coupling  the  terms 
“arbitral”  and  “justice”  because  decisions 
which  might  be  called  judicial  would  usually 
be  based  upon  a different  course  of  reasoning 
from  that  which  might  be  followed  in  arbitral 


14 


cases.  Arbitrators  may  properly  consider 
questions  of  temporary  policy  and  expediency 
and  are  frequently  expected  to  give  weight  to 
such  considerations.  The  judge  is  supposed 
to  be  in  the  main  free  from  such  influences. 
The  “Draft  Convention  relative  to  the  Creation 
of  a Judicial  Arbitration  Court”  drawn  up  at 
the  Hague  Convention  of  1907  is  a recognition 
of  the  demand  for  the  establishment  of  a 
judicial  in  the  place  of  an  arbitral  procedure  in 
international  relations,  and  the  consideration 
of  its  provisions  has  done  much  to  advance 
the  idea  of  the  establishment  of  a court  which 
shall  receive  the  sanction  of  the  “public  con- 
science.” 

The  steps  from  war  to  good  offices,  media- 
tion, commissions  of  inquiry,  arbitration,  and 
judicial  arbitration  have  been  forward  steps. 
The  general  approval  of  the  principle  of  the 
court  of  arbitral  justice  in  1907  is  a recognition 
of  the  fact  that  the  states  of  the  world  had 
since  1899  come  to  a clearer  understanding  of 
the  possibility  of  settlement  of  international 
differences  by  judicial  methods,  even  though 
agreement  could  not  be  reached  as  to  the 


15 


system  of  selecting  the  judges  to  constitute 
the  court  of  arbitral  justice. 

Allowance  may  be  made  for  wide  differences 
of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  possibility  of  im- 
mediate adoption  of  a plan  for  obligatory 
arbitration.  The  Final  Act  of  the  Second 
Hague  Peace  Conference  of  1907,  however,  de- 
clared that  while  it  was  unanimous  in  ad- 
mitting the  principle  of  compulsory  arbitra- 
tion “it  has  not  yet  been  found  feasible  to  con- 
clude a Convention  in  this  sense,  nevertheless 
the  divergences  of  opinion  which  have  come 
to  light  have  not  exceeded  the  bounds  of 
judicial  controversy,  and  that,  by  working 
together  here  during  the  four  months,  all  the 
Powers  of  the  world  have  not  only  come  to 
understand  one  another  and  have  drawn  closer 
together,  but  have  in  the  course  of  the  long 
labor  together  evolved  a very  lofty  conception 
of  the  common  welfare  of  humanity.”  Com- 
pulsory arbitration  for  all  differences  may 
involve  a more  elaborate  form  of  procedure  for 
the  arbitral  court  and  the  establishment  of  a 
means  for  securing  the  enforcement  of  the 
court  decisions.  The  decisions,  however, 


16 


would  be  by  arbitration  still  and  would  neces- 
sarily have  the  defects  of  that  method  of 
settlement. 

In  the  movement  for  international  justice, 
the  next  logical  step  will  be  the  establishment 
of  an  international  court  of  justice  to  do  for 
the  states  of  the  world  what  it  was  hoped 
might  be  done  by  other  means.  In  the  present 
state  of  civilization  courts  of  justice  are  the 
most  perfect  means  of  settlement  of  differ- 
ences which  have  passed  beyond  the  possi- 
bility of  settlement  by  friendly  negotiation, 
and  in  some  instances  the  better  settlement 
may  be  by  the  adjudication  of  the  court  rather 
than  by  friendly  negotiation  and  accordingly 
suits  are  often  by  mutual  agreement  of  the 
parties  brought  with  this  fact  in  view. 

The  problem  of  establishing  a law  for  the 
international  court  of  justice  is  in  the  process 
of  solution  through  the  formulation  of  many 
conventional  agreements  among  the  states  of 
the  world.  International  law  which  was  form- 
erly regarded  as  unworthy  of  the  name  of  law 
is  now  recognized  by  the  highest  courts  of 
civilized  nations  as  binding  in  their  decisions. 


1 7 


The  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  England  said  of  in- 
ternational law  in  igo5  it  “will  be  acknowl- 
edged and  applied  by  our  national  tribunals.” 

Agreement  upon  satisfactory  methods  of 
procedure  will  not  be  an  insurmountable 
difficulty  for  an  international  court  of  justice, 
as  courts  having  somewhat  similar  functions 
are  sufficiently  numerous  to  furnish  helpful 
suggestions. 

The  means  for  enforcement  of  the  judg- 
ments of  an  international  court  of  justice,  if 
other  than  the  sanction  of  the  “public  con- 
science” is  required,  may  perhaps  be  found  in 
the  proposed  international  military  force 
which  has  so  often  been  advocated  even  by 
the  most  ardent  friends  of  peace. 

It  would  need  little  argument  to  show  that 
war  is  rarely  a satisfactory  method  of  settling 
an  international  difference.  It  is  never  certain 
what  may  be  the  result  of  war  when  it  is  once 
begun.  The  victorious  party  may  rejoice  in 
the  victory,  may  gain  territory  or  indemnity, 
but  in  many  instances  the  differences  for 
which  the  war  was  undertaken  are  lost  to 


18 


sight  in  the  new  situations  which  arise  as  the 
conflict  progresses. 

Arbitration  in  any  of  its  forms  is  more  in 
accord  with  the  modern  sentiment  than  is  war. 
Yet  arbitration  from  its  nature,  from  its  con- 
ventional limitations,  and  because  of  ancient 
prejudice  against  this  method  of  settling  dis- 
putes cannot  in  all  cases  render  decisions 
which  will  receive  the  unqualified  sanction  of 
the  “public  conscience”  of  mankind.  The 
warmest  supporters  of  international  arbitra- 
tion now  realize  that  it  is  only  a long  step 
toward  another  means  of  settlement  of  inter- 
national disputes. 

This  is  the  means  which  the  American 
Society  for  Judicial  Settlement  of  Inter- 
national Disputes  is  organized  to  promote. 
This  society  exists  to  aid  all  efforts  to  hasten 
peace,  establish  good  will  among  nations,  to 
cooperate  with  all  agencies  and  to  support 
such  means  as  are  now  effective  in  averting 
war.  The  Society  forecasting  the  next  advance 
step  in  the  development  toward  permanent 
peace  has  for  its  main  purpose  “as  a principal 


19 


means  thereto,  to  promote  the  establishment 
of  an  international  court  of  justice  and  to  en- 
courage recourse  to  it  when  established.” 


20 


latent  a:I|ougl)t0 — Subtrial  0?til*m£nt 

GJuufmmr1 

uHjroiipr?  fflarbttrg 

I 

Although  the  peace  movement  is  still  a 
movement  of  intellectuals  it  is  no  longer  con- 
fined to  idealists.  That  fact  is  amply  illus- 
trated by  the  personnel  of  the  congress  held 
at  Washington,  December  15-17,  1910,  under 
the  auspices  of  the  American  Society  for 
Judicial  Settlement  of  International  Disputes. 

The  various  groups  of  practical  men  in 
close  touch  with  affairs — legislators,  states- 
men, educators  and  business  men — who  ad- 
dressed the  congress  were  likewise  liberally 
represented  in  the  crowded  and  interested  au- 
diences of  the  congress.2 

1 Reprinted  from  Proceedings  of  the  Conference. 

2 Among  the  speakers  at  the  congress  will  be  found  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  two  ex-Secretaries  of  State,  the 
presidents  of  three  of  our  leading  universities  and  the  president- 
emeritus  of  another,  an  ex-governor  of  Virginia,  the  governor- 
elect  of  Connecticut,  former  members  of  our  own  diplomatic 
service,  the  heads  of  three  important  foreign  legations  at  Wash- 
ington, present  and  former  members  of  Congress,  and  several 
men  foremost  in  American  industry  and  commerce. 


21 


The  explanation  of  this  change  in  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  peace  workers  lies  partly  in 
the  fact  that  the  growing  waste  of  armaments 
has  projected  this  question  into  the  arena  of 
practical  politics;  partly  in  the  actual  results 
accomplished  by  certain  existing  institutions, 
notably  those  set  up  at  The  Hague;  together 
with  the  manifest  need  of  additional  institu- 
tions of  a simple  nature  which  it  is  folly  to 
continue  without.  Among  the  latter  that 
which  in  the  minds  of  many  men  will  do  more 
to  make  war  difficult  than  any  institution  thus 
far  existing  or  suggested  is  a true  inter- 
national court  of  justice.  It  was  toward  the 
problem  of  such  a court — to  supplement,  not 
to  supplant,  the  existing  Permanent  Court  of 
Arbitration  at  The  Hague — that  the  atten- 
tion of  the  congress  was  mainly  directed. 

The  chief  aim  of  the  Society  was  declared 
to  be  an  international  court  which  shall  be 
permanent  and  shall  be  composed  of  judges 
by  profession  as  distinguished  from  the  present 
tribunals  of  arbitration  which  are  temporary 
and  which  are  composed  only  partly  of  judges 
and  partly  of  diplomats  and  statesmen  not 


necessarily  trained  in  the  law.  The  attraction 
which  the  very  existence  of  the  court  will 
exert,  and  the  impulsion  which  public  opinion 
will  supply,  should  together  result  in  the  sub- 
mission of  cases  to  the  court  more  and  more 
freely  until  the  court  is  set  fully  in  motion; 
exactly  as  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  after  considerable  delay,  and  the  Per- 
manent Court  of  Arbitration  at  The  Hague, 
a century  later,  were  both  happily  set  in 
motion  by  these  same  two  forces.  The  judg- 
ment of  a true  court  of  justice  properly  con- 
stituted should  meet  with  “ready  and  uni- 
versal acceptance”  and  “the  resultant  peace 
will  be  permanent  because  just  and  because 
based  upon  law  and  its  just  interpretation.”3 

The  great  usefulness  of  the  existing  Hague 
conventions,  particularly  the  Permanent  Court 
of  Arbitration,  is  amply  illustrated  by  the 
Affairs  of  Venezuela  (1904)  and  the  Casa- 
blanca affair  (1909)  in  which  acute  situations, 
the  one  involving  national  policy  and  the 
other  supposedly  involving  national  honor, 
were  cleared  up  by  submitting  the  cases  to 
The  Hague  Court.  The  Newfoundland  Fish- 

3 Scott. 

23 


eries  dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  a case  which  diplomacy  had 
vainly  attempted  to  settle  for  the  greater  part 
of  a century,  was  disposed  of  by  The  Hague 
Court  in  a few  weeks  (1910).  The  very  ex- 
istence of  The  Hague  Court  is  “an  inter- 
national question-mark”  when  men  are  in- 
clined to  war.  To  an  increasing  extent  the 
nations  search  their  own  hearts.  They  ask 
themselves  whether  the  popular  passion  is 
justified,  whether  the  sins  of  the  few  provok- 
ing agents  can  properly  be  visited  upon  the 
innocent  many  as  invariably  happens  in  war, 
and  whether,  after  all,  the  dispute  is  not 
capable  of  peaceful  solution  by  some  existing 
practice  or  institution.  “Thus  The  Hague 
conventions  are  bringing  about  a state  of 
mind  * * * which  makes  war  hard  and 

peace  easy.”4 

The  fertile  mind  of  ancient  Greece,  to  which 
the  world  owes  so  much  in  the  field  of  politics, 
was  not  dead  to  the  advantages  of  arbitra- 
tion.5 Arbitration  was  practiced  between  the 
Greek  states,  and  the  King  of  Sparta  is 


* Ralston. 

5 Brown. 


24 


credited  with  the  observation  that  “it  is  im- 
possible to  take  as  a transgressor  him  who 
offers  to  lay  his  grievance  before  a tribunal 
of  arbitration.”  Rome  rejected  the  institu- 
tion because  she  regarded  herself  as  the  sov- 
ereign of  the  world  declining  to  accept  other 
nations  as  her  equal.  In  the  middle  ages  the 
Pope  not  only  was  instrumental  in  having 
arbitration  clauses  introduced  into  treaties  but 
boldly  assumed  the  right  to  act  as  arbiter.  In 
1623  Emeric  Cruce  proposed  settling  all  inter- 
national differences  by  reference  to  a perma- 
nent assembly — with  its  seat  in  Venice — to  be 
composed  of  the  representatives  of  all  the 
Eastern  and  Western  nations;  while  Grotius 
in  his  War  and  Peace  (1625)  advocated  their 
adjustment  by  a congress  of  disinterested 
powers  with  authority  to  impose  its  will  on 
the  disputants.6 

A court  to  decide  controversies  between 
states  actually  appeared  for  the  first  time  in 
history  in  the  form  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  which  nation  is  “a  congeries 
of  independent  and  autonomous  States  with 
full  rights  of  sovereignty  except  so  far  as  each 


6 Brown. 


25 


has  delegated  to  the  general  government  cer- 
tain powers  essential  to  a unified  existence.”7 

In  its  legislative  branch  the  federal  govern- 
ment is  one  of  enumerated  powers.  Not  so 
in  its  judicial  branch,  since  the  constitution 
has  vested  in  the  Supreme  Court  the  entire 
judicial  power  of  the  nation.  That  tribunal 
sits  as  “an  international  as  well  as  a domestic 
tribunal”  and  applies  “Federal  law,  State  law 
and  international  law  as  the  exigencies  of  the 
case  demand.”  In  this  way  it  settles  contro- 
versies which  elsewhere  lead  to  war.8 

A survey  of  the  cases  in  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  involving  disputes  be- 
tween states — boundary  and  other — develops 
the  significant  fact  that  compulsory  process 
has  not  been  required  to  enforce  the  decrees 
of  the  court.  This  observation  falls  when  con- 
troversies of  a burning  nature  array  a large 
number  of  states  on  one  side  against  a large 
number  on  the  other;  “It  was  monstrous  to 
suppose  that  a universal  agitation  could  be 
quieted  down  by  the  opinion  of  a majority  of 
nine  men.”9 


7 Brown. 

8 F.  N.  Judson. 

9 Brown. 


26 


Differences  of  religion  and  race  make  the 
problem  of  a high  court  before  which  all  the 
nations  shall  on  occasion  yield  their  sover- 
eignty much  more  difficult  than  was  the 
problem  of  a Supreme  Court  for  a group  of 
states  like  the  United  States  bound  by  ties  of 
a common  language  and  common  institu- 
tions,10 but  that  which  offers  the  greatest  ob- 
stacle is  “the  conflicting  interests  of  the  na- 
tions, always  more  selfish  than  the  best  of 
their  citizens.”* 11 

The  development  of  the  American  doc- 
trine of  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  over  states 
is  traced  from  the12  early  colonial  period  in 
which  the  mother  country  was  conceded  to 
have  only  a “leadership  in  judgment”  (the 
Greek  attitude)  as  opposed  to  the  actual 
power  to  command  (the  imperium  of  the 
Latins).  It  was  out  of  this  conception  that 
the  practice  grew  of  binding  our  governments 
by  written  constitutions  regarded  as  emanat- 
ing from  the  people. 

About  the  time  the  colonies  were  being 
founded  the  belief  that  courts  could  success- 


10  Brown. 

11  Macfarland. 

12  Snow. 


27 


fully  exercise  jurisdiction  over  states  was 
markedly  strengthened  by  the  case  of  Postnati 
which  determined  the  status  of  Scots  in  Eng- 
land after  the  accession  of  James  VI  of  Scot- 
land to  the  throne  of  England  as  James  I. 
The  significant  features  of  this  case  were  that 
the  court,  although  nominally  a conference 
between  the  Lords  and  Commons  to  which 
the  judges  of  England  were  invited  as  coun- 
sellors, was  in  fact  an  extraordinary  Tribunal; 
that  the  case  was  argued  “from  the  standpoint 
of  the  civil  law,  ‘the  law  of  nations  and  of 
reason,’  the  history  of  nations  and  the  com- 
mon law;”  that  it  settled  a dispute  between 
England  and  Scotland;  and  that  it  recognized 
a supreme  law  common  to  England  and  to 
the  countries  connected  with  her  politically.13 

Disputes  between  the  colonies  or  between 
a colony  and  England  were  habitually  referred 
to  tribunals  in  England,  the  establishment  and 
maintenance  of  which  tribunals  the  colonies 
were  willing  to  intrust  to  England.  Therefore, 
it  was  natural  that  when  the  American  colo- 
nies became  independent  of  England,  they 
should  provide,  first — under  the  articles  of 

13  Snow. 

28 


confederation — a voluntary  tribunal  to  settle 
disputes  between  states,  especially  constructed 
for  each  case,  and  later — under  the  Constitu- 
tion— a permanent  Supreme  Court  which 
should  have  jurisdiction  of  such  disputes. 

It  is  the  conception  of  a “supreme  universal 
law  securing  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  in- 
dividual against  all  government,”  which  is 
the  basis  of  the  indissoluble  Union  of  the 
United  States  of  America;  which  has  gov- 
erned the  conduct  of  local  courts  in  America, 
in  England  and  elsewhere,  as  well  as  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States;  and 
which  may  prove  “the  most  efficient  bond  of 
union”  among  the  nations  of  the  world  if  there 
is  set  up  an  international  supreme  court. 
“The  test  of  the  international  character  of  a 
court  is  not  whether  it  is  established  by  the 
nations,  but  whether  it  administers  a law 
which  is  supreme  over  the  nations.”14 

The  decisions  of  the  courts  as  a source  of 
law  are  recalled  as  a most  urgent  reason  why 
the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  at  The 
Hague  should  be  supplemented  by  a true  in- 


14  Snow. 


29 


ternational  court  of  justice.15  Such  a court, 
dealing  with  various  systems  of  law,  would 
perhaps  not  build  up  the  law  as  readily  as  a 
court  governed  by  the  principles  of  the  Eng- 
lish Common  Law  exclusively;  but  while  in 
theory  Roman  law  courts  are  not  governed 
by  previous  decisions,  they  do  in  point  of  fact 
constantly  yield  to  precedent.  In  contrast  to 
the  body  of  judge-made  law  which  arises 
wherever  true  courts  of  justice  exist  is  the 
barrenness  of  the  arbitration  tribunal  as  a 
source  of  law. 

The  aim  of  a court  of  arbitration  is  to  com- 
pose differences  and  the  spirit  of  compromise 
which  prevails  as  a result  thereof  can  hardly 
yield  lasting  principles  of  law  or  justice. 

The  force  of  this  criticism  is  realized  when 
we  recall  the  displeasure  with  which  the 
Geneva  Award  is  still  regarded  by  many  im- 
partial minds  because  of  its  tendency  to 
burden  the  neutral  in  time  of  war  with  duties 
more  or  less  difficult  to  discharge,  instead  of 
placing  the  burdens  of  war  where  they  belong, 
i.  e.,  on  the  belligerent.  Sir  Henry  Maine  felt 


15  Wambaugh. 


30 


that  the  principle  laid  down  in  the  Geneva 
Award  must  some  day  be  discarded. 

This  particular  defect  of  arbitration  is  illus- 
trated by  the  way  in  which  industrial  arbitra- 
tion tends  to  precipitate  conflict  by  reason  of 
the  belief  that  the  principle  of  compromise 
will  result  in  at  least  part  of  the  demands, 
however  unjust,  being  granted.  It  diminishes 
the  risks  of  open  strife,  and  while  it  serves  to 
compose  conflicts  actually  begun  “in  the  large 
view  and  in  the  long  run  it  rather  encourages 
and  promotes  industrial  strife  than  prevents 
it.”16  The  reference  should  be  to  some  tri- 
bunal the  controlling  principle  of  which  is 
justice  so  that  the  disputants  would  face  the 
possibility  of  having  their  whole  contention 
denied.  This  tribunal  need  not  necessarily  be 
a court  but  might  well  take  the  form  of  a 
board  of  inquiry  as  in  Canada,  public  opinion 
being  relied  upon  to  force  a just  settlement 
after  the  facts  have  been  brought  to  light. 
“As  a means  of  preventing  industrial  war- 
fare” this  latter  “far  surpasses  every  arbitra- 
tion scheme  that  has  ever  been  tried.”17  The 

is  Eliot. 

IT  Eliot. 

31 


peaceful  settlement  of  such  a serious  incident 
as  the  Dogger  Bank  affair  (1904)  as  the  re- 
sult simply  of  an  investigation  of  the  facts 
conducted  before  the  International  Commis- 
sion of  Inquiry  at  The  Hague  shows  that  this 
method  is  not  less  effective  in  the  inter- 
national field. 

The  causes  of  war  were  attributed  to  three 
principal  sources  of  disagreement  involving : 
(a)  rights  over  territory,  trade  privileges, 
etcetera;  (b)  national  policy  which  may  de- 
mand that  a country  be  allowed  to  push  its 
trade  in  certain  spheres,  to  acquire  new  ter- 
ritory or  influence,  or  “insist  upon  a certain 
course  of  action  by  other  countries;”  (c)  na- 
tional feeling  which  though  often  deep  and 
bitter  and  “the  most  dangerous  of  all  causes 
of  war  * * * ordinarily  depends  in  the 

beginning  upon  different  views  regarding  the 
specific  rights  of  the  two  countries.”18 

The  establishment  of  a true  international 
court  of  justice  is  an  urgent  need.  Not  only 
would  its  operation  at  once  begin  to  create 
authoritative  international  law  in  the  form  «f 
judge-made  law,  but  its  very  existence  would 

18  Root. 

32 


invite  the  codification  of  certain  spheres  of  in- 
ternational law  and  the  formal  adoption  of 
such  law  by  the  nations,  just  as  the  Prize 
Court,  adopted  by  the  Second  Hague  Confer- 
ence, led  to  the  London  Conference  (1908-9) 
which  codified  the  law  of  prize. 

The  criticism  has  been  made  that  the 
awards  of  courts  of  arbitration  have  been  so 
generally  accepted — between  250  and  260  since 
1815 — because  burning  questions  have  not 
been  submitted  to  arbitration;  that  wars 
which  have  actually  occurred  were  over  dif- 
ferences too  serious  for  peaceable  adjustment. 
There  is  much  force  in  this  criticism,  but  an 
impartial  analysis19  of  wars  in  which  our  own 
country  has  engaged  shows  that,  at  least 
as  applied  to  us,  the  criticism  is  far  too 
sweeping ; that  many  of  the  controversies 
could  have  been  peaceably  composed  and  that 
certainly  if,  at  the  time  of  these  wars,  an  in- 
ternational court  had  existed  and  international 
practice  in  regard  to  the  subjects  of  the  con- 
troversies had  been  as  defined  as  now,  these 
wars  could  have  been  avoided.  Moreover, 
nations  which  hesitate  to  enter  a court  of 

18  Foster. 

33 


arbitration  because  they  regard  the  interests 
at  stake  as  too  important  to  subject  to  risk  of 
compromise,  will  be  more  willing  to  abide  the 
decision  of  a true  court  of  justice  which  shall 
be  governed  by  established  international  prac- 
tice, or,  in  its  absence,  will  at  least  apply  the 
general  principles  of  justice. 

The  objection  to  having  on  an  international 
tribunal  nationals  who  must  be  consciously 
or  unconsciously  prejudiced  in  favor  of  their 
country  and  who  act  as  advocates  rather  than 
judges  is  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the  proper 
relation  between  court  and  counsel  cannot 
obtain  between  them  and  the  umpire,  who  is 
a fellow  judge  and  may  be  addressed  by  them 
at  any  time.20 

The  later  system  of  allowing  the  disputants 
to  select  non-nationals  has  not  overcome  the 
difficulty  because  the  non-nationals  “readily 
take  on  the  color — the  attitude  of  mind — of 
the  disputant  to  whom  they  owe  their  selec- 
tion.”21 Not  only  should  no  national  ever 
again  be  allowed  to  sit  upon  arbitration  tribu- 
nals, including  The  Hague  Tribunal,  but  there 

20  Ralston. 

21  McKenney. 

34 


should  exist  a freely  acknowledged  right  to 
challenge  any  of  the  proposed  arbitrators,  for 
the  reason  that  the  close  relations  existing  be- 
tween some  nations  make  their  subjects  quite 
as  predisposed  to  favor  the  cause  of  a friendly 
country  as  its  own  national  would  be.22 

Touching  the  question  of  the  powers  of  the 
proposed  court,  it  is  presumed  that  it  would 
start  with  very  limited  or  no  jurisdiction,  that 
questions  would  be  referred  to  it  voluntarily 
or  by  agreement  of  the  powers  in  pairs  or 
otherwise,  but  that  the  growing  confidence  of 
the  world  in  the  probity  and  ability  of  the 
court  would  gradually  lead  to  an  ever  widen- 
ing jurisdiction.  An  ultimate  extreme  posi- 
tion, involving  jurisdiction  over  the  question 
of  the  very  independence  of  a state,  is  im- 
agined as  follows:  “If,  for  instance,  a given 
nation  should  prove  to  be  so  unruly,  so  anti- 
social and  so  injurious  to  international  order 
that  its  existence  ought  no  longer  to  be  toler- 
ated, the  powers,  acting  together  on  the  man- 
date of  an  international  judicial  tribunal  rather 
than  on  the  mandate  or  agreement  of  the  for- 
eign offices,  might  decree  the  extinction  of  the 

22  Ralston. 

35 


national  life  of  the  state  in  question,  just  as 
the  criminal  court  within  a state  may  decree 
the  extinction  of  the  life  of  a malefactor.  It 
may  easily  be  that  such  a case  would  never 
happen.  At  the  same  time  it  is  conceivable; 
and  should  it  occur,  would  it  not  rest  on  a far 
sounder  basis  than  transactions  which  have 
occurred  in  the  past,  and  which,  whatever 
their  justification  in  point  of  equity,  after  all. 
have  had  the  appearance  of  simple  inter- 
national spoliation.”23 

Moreover,  if  given  jurisdiction  over  internal 
disputes  which  are  acute  and  threaten  wide- 
spread disorder  or  revolution,  an  international 
court  may  at  times  prove  effective  in  avoiding 
civil  war;  although,  before  this  much-desired 
result  can  be  reached,  the  nations  must  recog- 
nize as  supreme  and  universal  the  rule  that 
no  political  entity  be  allowed  to  deprive  the 
individual  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without 
due  process  of  law.24 

In  considering  the  difficulties  of  the  com- 
position of  the  proposed  international  court, 
which  would  be  too  unwieldy  if  each  of  the 


23  Harry  Pratt  Judson. 
Snow. 


36 


forty-three  nations  participating  in  the  Second 
Hague  Conference  should  be  allotted  a per- 
manent representative  in  the  court,  we  are  re- 
minded that  “in  the  discussion  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  the  then  thirteen 
states  were  considered,  with  all  their  ideas 
of  sovereignty  provided  for  in  the  composition 
of  the  United  States  Senate,  as  having  pos- 
sible rights  to  be  represented  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States.”25  Owing  to  the 
difficulty  of  arriving  at  an  acceptable  basis  of 
representation  in  the  court,  it  may  be  neces- 
sary to  set  up  a court  without  the  initial  co- 
operation of  the  smaller  states,  the  high  char- 
acter of  the  court  and  its  practical  advantage 
being  relied  upon  ultimately  to  induce  such 
states  to  adhere  to  it.26 

The  fundamental  requisites  for  a perma- 
nently successful  court,  were  indicated  as 
“First,  that  its  procedure  be  expeditious  and 
the  rights  of  contending  parties  be  guaran- 
teed; second,  that  the  constituents  of  which 
it  is  composed  be  respected  by  all  civilized 
nations;  and  lastly,  that  the  principles  it  is 

25  Macfarland. 

26  Do. 

37 


called  upon  to  apply  be  clear,  and  such  as 
shall  have  merited  universal  approval.”27 

The  latter  need,  the  need  of  searching  out 
the  fundamental  principles  of  international 
law  and  justice,  of  formulating  them,  and 
of  having  them  adopted  by  the  civilized  na- 
tions must  be  considered  not  only  with  refer- 
ence to  the  proposed  court,  but  with  reference 
likewise  to  the  general  good  relations  of  the 
world.  The  lack  of  authoritative  international 
law  which  shall  be  binding  upon  the  nations 
and  their  citizens,  as  municipal  law  is  binding 
upon  the  individual,  constitutes  one  of  the 
main  hindrances  to  all-inclusive  treaties  of  ar- 
bitration.28 The  new  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
Peace  was  urged  to  initiate  this  work.29 

Although  the  scantiness  of  such  authorita- 
tive international  law  is  clearly  recognized,  it 
is  presumed  that  the  nations  will  none  the  less 
boldly  empower  the  proposed  international 
court  to  fall  back  upon  the  wisdom  of  its  day 
and  declare  as  law  what  it  finds  to  be  the  just 
practice  of  men.  Just  as  the  ancient  tribe, 
in  the  absence  of  written  codes,  relied  upon  its 

27  de  la  Barra. 

2S  Riddell. 

29  Pace. 

38 


judges  to  declare  the  law,  so  “the  great  tribe 
of  the  world”  will  set  up  a body  of  judges  who 
shall  say  “There  is  no  code,  but  this  is  the 
wisdom  and  the  justice  of  the  human  society 
to  which  we  belong.”30  In  much  the  same  way 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has 
proceeded  to  interpret  and  apply  international 
law.  “For  this  purpose,  where  there  is  no 
treaty  and  no  controlling  executive  or  legisla- 
tive act  or  judicial  decision,”  says  the  court 
itself,  “resort  must  be  had  to  the  customs  and 
usages  of  civilized  nations,  and  as  an  evidence 
of  this,  to  the  works  of  jurists  and  commen- 
tators who,  by  years  of  labor,  research  and 
experience,  have  made  themselves  peculiarly 
well  acquainted  with  the  subjects  which 
they  treat.  Such  works  are  resorted  to  by 
judicial  tribunals,  not  for  the  speculation  of 
their  authors  as  to  what  the  law  ought  to  be, 
but  for  trustworthy  evidence  of  what  the  law 
really  is.”  (In  re.  Paquet  Habana,  175  U.  S. 
677-)31 

By  reason  of  the  growth  of  judge-made  law, 
supplemented  by  codification,  authoritative 

so  Crosby. 

81  Quoted  by  F.  N.  Judson. 

39 


international  law  will  be  developed  at  a pace 
hitherto  unprecedented,  making  text  books 
obsolete  at  short  intervals.  Just  as  the  prac- 
tical inventions  have  made  more  progress  in 
the  past  century  than  in  the  whole  previous 
period  of  recorded  history,  so  definitive  inter- 
national law,  in  the  true  acceptation  of  the 
term,  is  likely  to  show  greater  development 
in  the  near  future,  following  the  establish- 
ment of  an  international  court  of  justice,  than 
in  the  whole  past. 

As  international  lav/  should  adjust  and 
reconcile  “not  override  conflicting  systems”32 
of  law,  the  question  presents  itself  to  what 
extent  the  proposed  international  court  will 
be  expected  to  combine  the  principles  of  the 
court  of  law  and  the  court  of  equity,  and,  until 
the  law  becomes  more  definitive,  even  intro- 
duce in  a measure  the  spirit  of  compromise 
which  characterizes  diplomacy.  Some  such 
broad  character  must  attach  both  to  the  law 
and  the  court  in  order  to  make  them  accept- 
able in  the  beginning  and  perhaps  for  many 
years  to  come.  “A  true  international  court 
of  jurists  will  have  an  international  mode  of 

82  Hirst. 

40 


interpretation,  a blend  perhaps  of  the  civil  law 
and  the  common  law,  or  of  Oriental  and 
Western  rules.”33 

Although,  “to  our  shame  and  reproach”34 
war  is  still  resorted  to,  as  in  primitive  times, 
for  the  settlement  of  international  disputes, 
yet  much  progress  has  been  made  in  the  atti- 
tude of  nation  toward  nation.  “God  with  his 
mighty  wind  has  shaken  his  hand  over  the 
river  and  men  are  beginning  to  go  dry  shod 
on  the  places  where  once  there  was  no  pas- 
sage.”35 At  the  Second  Hague  Conference, 
all  the  nations  agreed  that  there  should  be  an 
international  court  of  arbitral  justice  and 
“when  all  the  nations  of  the  earth  say  there 
ought  to  be,  it  means  that  there  must  be  and 
will  be  such  a court.”36  The  governments 
are  not  idle  but  they  need  public  sentiment 
back  of  them. 

II 

The  papers  and  discussions  were  confined 
in  an  unusual  degree  to  the  topic  of  the  con- 

33  Hirst. 

3*  Stockton. 

35  Page. 

88  Choate. 


41 


ference,  namely,  the  need  for,  the  probable 
advantages  of,  and  way  to  secure,  an  interna- 
tional court  of  justice.  Most  notable  among 
the  exceptions  were:  a strong  exposition  of 
the  waste  involved  in  preparation  for  war,37 
accompanied  by  a less  convincing  analysis  of 
the  relation  of  it  to  the  high  cost  of  living; 
and  a powerful  philippic,  of  the  kind  calcu- 
lated to  arouse  the  public  conscience,  on  the 
biological  effects  of  war,  the  reversed  selec- 
tion— the  survival  of  the  unfit — which  results 
from  war.38  Difficulties  confront  any  nation 
which  may  desire  to  curtail  its  outlay  on  arma- 
ments independently  of  other  nations ; but  at 
the  same  time  we  will  search  the  history  of 
states  in  vain  for  a parallel  to  the  present 
united  folly  of  the  nations  in  “solemnly  cast- 
ing into  the  sea  the  treasure  of  their  people,” 
the  product  of  their  toil,  wrung  from  them  by 
taxation  excessively  burdensome  to  many. 
For  such  parallel  we  are  compelled  to  turn  to 
the  “eccentricities  of  foolish  individuals.”39 
The  freedom  of  the  United  States  from  the 
danger  of  attack  as  compared  with  European 

37  Cockran. 

38  Jordan. 

89  Cockran. 

42 


countries  leads  to  the  inference  that  while 
we  should  maintain  a navy,  effective  and  up- 
to-date,  there  is  no  excuse  for  attempting  to 
rival  the  expensive  armaments  of  European 
nations.  Our  geographical  position  is  such, 
our  population  so  large,  our  productive  ca- 
pacity, agricultural  and  manufacturing,  “so 
colossal  that  any  nation  which  should  attempt 
to  attack  us,  save  in  her  own  defense,  would 
be  guilty  of  that  folly  with  which  the  gods  visit 
alike  men  and  nations  whom  they  wish  to 
destroy.”40 

On  the  subject  of  the  biological  effects  of 
war,  it  was  remarked  in  connection  with  the 
death-roll  of  a certain  battle  that  “the  signif- 
icance of  such  events  lies  not  in  the  fate  of 
kings,  nor  does  it  lie  in  the  fate  of  the  men, 
nor  yet  in  the  waste  of  their  lives,  nor  even  in 
the  sorrows  of  those  who  loved  them.”  Rather 
is  it  to  be  sought  in  the  effect  upon  the  race 
through  killing  off  the  bravest,  the  most  pa- 
triotic, the  most  enterprising  and  the  best 
physically.41 

40  Page. 

41  Jordan. 

43 


As  pointed  out  by  Lamarck,  the  selective 
process,  supposed  to  be  due  to  the  struggle 
between  individuals,  is  modified  as  a source 
of  progress  among  men  as  well  as  among  the 
lower  animals,  by  the  more  potent  principle 
of  adaptation  to  environment ; while  the  de- 
creasing birthrate  in  highly  civilized  countries 
certainly  does  away  with  the  old  argument 
that  war,  like  pestilence,  is  needed  to  keep 
down  numbers.42 

The  perfection  of  air  craft  of  late  has  been 
so  rapid  and  the  wholesale  destruction  of  life 
and  property  which  may  result  from  their  use 
in  war  so  patent  that  they  can  no  longer  be 
disregarded  by  the  disciples  of  international 
peace.  “The  wildest  dreams  of  aviation  are 
less  than  the  accomplished  fact  a month 
later.”43  If  the  present  rate  of  progress  con- 
tinues it  will  be  but  a short  time  before  aero- 
planes as  well  as  airships  will  be  able  to  pene- 
trate to  the  very  heart  of  the  largest  countries. 
Government  buildings,  works  and  stores,  gas 
and  electric  light  plants,  all  could  be  de- 
stroyed. “The  capital  and  every  prominent 


42  Jusserand. 

43  Gregory. 


44 


town  could  be  reduced  to  helplessness  and 
panic  * * * about  in  the  condition  of  San 

Francisco  after  the  fire  and  earthquake.”  The 
whole  territory  of  a nation  being  open  to 
attack,  every  centre  of  population  in  constant 
danger,  there  should  be  less  eagerness  to  rush 
to  war  than  under  the  old  conditions  when 
only  a small  fraction  of  the  people  were  on 
the  firing  line.44 

Another  device  for  abating  strife  among 
nations  is  neutralization.  It  has  been  applied 
to  Switzerland,  Belgium,  and  Luxemburg  long 
enough  to  prove  its  value.  The  fact  that  cer- 
tain great  powers  stood  ready  to  forbid  any 
violation  of  the  independence  or  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  these  states  has  certainly  acted  as 
an  effective  deterrent  to  powerful  neighbors 
who  otherwise  might  have  been  tempted  to 
commit  acts  of  aggression  against  them.  The 
world  is  probably  destined  to  see  a great  ex- 
tension of  this  principle  not  only  with  regard 
to  small  independent  powers  but  possibly  with 
regard  to  certain  areas  or  possessions  of  some 
of  the  great  powers.  But  the  principle  is  not 


44  Gregory. 


45 


capable  of  universal  application.45  The  prog- 
ress of  the  world  may  be  retarded  by  the 
neutralization  of  countries  where  backward 
conditions  prevail.  It  might  be  well  to  lay 
down  some  such  principle  as  this  e.  g.,  that 
neutralization  is  applicable  with  advantage 
only  to  countries  which  have  fairly  just  laws 
administered  with  some  approximation  of 
justice. 

The  Interparliamentary  Union,  which  has 
met  annually  for  the  past  seven  years,  is  a 
body  of  over  2,000  present  and  former  mem- 
bers of  the  parliaments  of  the  world  “bending 
every  energy  to  substitute  law  and  justice  for 
peace.”40 

It  is  suggested  that  the  Interparliamentary 
Union  should  be  reorganized  by  providing  for 
a less  unwieldy  number  of  members  who  shall 
be  chosen  and  especially  delegated  by  the 
home  parliaments.  Add  to  this  provision  an 
agreement  on  the  part  of  the  home  parlia- 
ments that  all  measures  adopted  by  the  Inter- 
parliamentary Union  shall  be,  not  necessarily 
approved  by  them,  but  at  least  considered  and 

45  Foulke. 

46  Bartholdt. 

46 


given  a chance  to  be  approved,  and  a great 
step  will  be  taken  toward  giving  expression 
to  the  international  will.  Since  over  against 
this  quasi-popular  branch  of  an  international 
legislature,  we  have  in  embryo  an  upper  house 
in  the  form  of  the  Hague  Conferences,  the 
members  of  which  are  delegated  by  the  execu- 
tive branches  of  the  home  governments,  it  is 
not  unlikely  that  in  the  course  of  time  these 
two  bodies  will  evolve  a true  international 
parliament.  The  origin  of  most  of  our  sound 
institutions  is  in  the  needs  of  the  community. 
There  is  very  great  need  of  an  institution 
which  shall  help  to  crystallize  and  give  au- 
thority to  the  more  commonly  accepted  prac- 
tices of  the  world  today  in  international  rela- 
tions and  thus  help  build  up  authoritative  in- 
ternational law. 

With  regard  to  an  international  force  de- 
signed to  compel  submission  to  the  decrees  of 
the  proposed  court,  it  was  suggested  that 
such  a force  be  formed  by  taking  a specific 
proportion  of  existing  armaments,  and  allow- 
ing them  to  remain  under  the  control  of  the 
separate  governments,  ready  to  cooperate 


47 


when  required.47  On  the  other  hand,  the  idea 
of  employing  military  power  at  all  to  enforce 
the  decrees  of  the  court  was  rejected  because 
of  the  many  obstacles,  including  national 
jealousies,  to  the  exercise  of  such  power. 
Public  opinion  was  thought  to  be  a better 
sanction  and  in  course  of  time  could  be  de- 
veloped into  an  effective  sanction.48  It  is 
feared  in  some  quarters  that  an  international 
force  may  prove  an  instrument  of  intolerable 
tyranny.49  “Now  that  the  nineteenth  century 
has  made  the  world  one  neighborhood  and 
the  twentieth  century  is  making  it  a brother- 
hood * * * the  public  opinion  of  the 
world,  which  is  in  advance  of  the  general 
opinion  of  governments,”  will  prove  a more 
effective  sanction  for  the  decrees  of  an  inter- 
national court  than  any  other  coercive 
measures.50 

A nation  having  agreed  to  submit  a contro- 
versy to  the  court  is  not  likely  to  brave  the 
adverse  opinion  of  the  world  by  refusing  to 

47  Ginn. 

48  Brown. 

49  Stockton. 

50  Macfarland. 


48 


abide  by  the  decision.51, 52  “In  this  era  of 
world  history”  such  a course  “is  unthink- 
able”^ 

Questions  of  honor  and  vital  interest  have 
hitherto  been  excluded  by  the  more  powerful 
countries  from  the  scope  of  treaties  for  the 
submission  of  future  disputes  to  arbitration. 
So  long  as  these  exceptions  remained,  arbitra- 
tion treaties  were  not  a guarantee  of  peace, 
for  the  double  reason  that  questions  actually 
involving  honor,  etcetera,  might  at  any  time 
arise  and  that  a nation  bent  on  mischief 
might  so  interpret  other  questions.  It  was 
therefore  of  distinct  advantage  to  the  future 
peaceful  relations  of  the  world  when,  earlier 
in  the  year,  the  President  of  the  United  States 
declared  that  he  saw  no  reason  why  questions 
of  honor  should  be  so  excluded.  But,  at  the 
Washington  conference  of  the  society,  the  gap 
was  completely  closed  by  the  new  pronounce- 
ment of  President  Taft  in  favor  of  an  agree- 
ment which  shall  serve  to  demonstrate  that 
all  questions,  even  such  as  involve  honor  or 
territory,  may  be  safely  referred  to  an  inter- 

51  Cockran. 

*2  Foulke. 

53  Baldwin. 

49 


national  arbitral  court.  The  statement  at- 
tracted world-wide  attention;  it  was  the  sub- 
ject of  a telegram  of  congratulation  from  the 
editors  of  the  leading  Liberal  newspapers  of 
England,  and  it  is  likely  to  lead  to  important 
practical  results.  It  must  remain  the  most 
notable  utterance  of  the  congress. 

The  donor  of  the  sum  of  ten  million  dollars 
to  the  cause  of  peace — which  gift  had  been 
announced  on  the  previous  day — made  only 
casual  reference  to  its  possible  application, 
preferring  that  the  trustees  of  the  fund  be  un- 
trammelled in  the  use  which  they  shall  make 
of  it,  and  addressed  himself  to  the  moral  issue 
in  war.  He  declared  that  “it  was  the  moral 
side  of  slavery,  of  buying  and  selling  men  and 
women,  which  finally  brought  about  its  aboli- 
tion. And  so  I believe  it  will  be  with  war.”5^ 

This  power  of  the  idea,  the  tendency  of  the 
rightness  of  things  to  assert  itself,  was  not 
neglected.  It  is  not  by  men  nor  by  aggrega- 
tions of  men  that  the  world  is  really  ruled, 
but  by  ideas;  and  the  idea  of  the  judicial  set- 
tlement of  international  disputes  is  growing 


54  Carnegie. 


50 


apace  because  its  basis  is  justice.55  “After 
all,  what  rules  the  world,  the  one  thing  that  is 
eternal  and  all  powerful,  is  the  intangible  and 
the  sentimental.”56 

53  Page. 

50  Root. 


The  conference  refrained  from  entertaining  and  adopting 
resolutions,  believing  that  it  would  prove  most  useful  by  con- 
fining its  activities  to  a thorough  discussion  of  the  problem  before 
it.  However,  after  its  close  a small  group  of  men  who  had 
taken  a leading  part  in  it  met  and  drew  up  unofficially  that 
which  they  regarded  as  the  consensus  of  opinion  brought  out 
during  the  sessions.  This  declaration  is  as  follows: 

1.  The  proposed  international  court  of  justice  should  be  a 
development  from  previous  methods,  something  more  highly  per- 
fected. Other  peaceful  methods  should  be  retained  and  applied. 

2.  The  court  should  be  a court  of  law  and  equity  applying 
principles  of  equity  and  good  conscience,  and  having  regard  to 
all  systems  of  law  and  the  precedents  under  all  systems;  all 
questions,  except  those  of  pure  policy,  to  be  submitted  to  it. 

3.  A permanent  international  court  should  be  constituted 
immediately  by  such  states  as  desire  it,  leaving  it  open  to  ac- 
cess of  other  powers  or  to  their  future  adherence. 

4.  Inasmuch  as  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  is  a 
court  for  the  States  composing  the  American  Union  and  has 
repeatedly  decided  controversies  between  them,  the  origin,  history 
and  practical  working  of  that  court  should  be  carefully  studied. 

5.  The  practicability  of  creating  a sentiment  in  schools,  col- 
leges and  universities  in  favor  of  the  settlement  of  international 
disputes  by  means  other  than  war  should  be  considered. 


51 


©fjtrfc  National  pparp  (Cmtgrpss 
Haltimor?,  iHatj  3-4-5-G,  1911 

RESOLUTIONS. 

i 

WHEREAS,  there  is  a great  and  growing 
sentiment  between  English-speaking  peoples 
in  favor  of  the  settlement  of  all  disputes  by 
means  other  than  war,  a sentiment  which  has 
found  memorable  expression  in  the  utterances 
of  President  William  Howard  Taft  and  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  therefore  be  it 
Resolved,  that  the  Congress  records  its  pro- 
found appreciation  of  the  attitude  and  action 
of  President  Taft  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  this 
important  subject  and  expresses  its  firm  con- 
viction that,  if  the  proposed  treaty  is  made, 
the  example  thus  set  by  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  will  be  followed  by  other  na- 
tions. 


52 


2 


Resolved,  that  this  Congress  notes  with  sat- 
isfaction the  zeal  and  ability  with  which  the 
Honorable  Philander  C.  Knox,  Secretary  of 
State,  has  been  carrying  forward  the  work 
initiated  by  his  predecessor  looking  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  International  Prize  Court 
and  of  the  International  Court  of  Arbitral 
Justice.  It  regards  both  these  institutions  as 
of  the  highest  importance  in  themselves  and 
urges  the  earliest  possible  establishment  of  the 
Court  of  Arbitral  Justice  by  such  of  the  powers 
as  are  willing  to  organize  it,  leaving  it  open  to 
the  adherence  of  other  pov/ers  later  on  and 
free  of  access  to  them  in  the  meantime. 

3 

WHEREAS,  the  practice  of  not  including 
within  the  scope  of  so-called  general  arbitra- 
tion treaties  questions  which  affect  the  vital 
interests  or  the  honor  of  the  contracting  states 
and  the  interests  of  third  parties  greatly 
diminishes  the  value  of  such  treaties,  be  it 


53 


Resolved,  that  this  Congress  urges  upon  the 
United  States  Government  the  importance  of 
formulating  an  all-inclusive  arbitration  treaty 
on  the  lines  of  the  proposed  treaty  with  Great 
Britain  with  a view  to  its  adoption  jointly 
by  the  leading  powers. 


4 

WHEREAS,  the  treaty  relating  to  pecuni- 
ary claims  originally  adopted  by  the  Second 
International  American  Conference,  and  re- 
newed by  the  Third  and  Fourth  Conferences, 
not  only  definitely  binds  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties  to  submit  to  arbitration  a certain 
and  very  large  and  important  class  of  cases 
but  does  this  without  making  qualifications  or 
exceptions  that  nullify  or  tend  to  nullify  the 
force  of  the  engagement,  therefore  be  it 

Resolved,  that  this  Congress,  following  the 
practical  precedent  here  set,  recommends  the 
more  general  adoption  by  governments  of 
treaties  whereby  all  claims  for  pecuniary  loss 
or  damage  which  may  be  presented  by  their 
respective  citizens  or  subjects  and  which  can- 


54 


not  be  amicably  adjusted  through  diplomatic 
channels  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Hague 
Court. 

5 

Resolved,  that  the  proposed  celebration  in 
1915  of  the  one  hundredth  anniversary  of 
peace  among  English-speaking  peoples  is 
viewed  by  the  Congress  with  satisfaction,  the 
more  especially  as  attention  will  thus  be  di- 
rected to  the  happy  results  of  the  enlightened 
statesmanship  which  has  refrained  from  erect- 
ing fortifications  along  the  3700  miles  of  fron- 
tier between  Canada  and  the  United  States 
and  has  excluded  war  vessels  from  the  bound- 
ary waters. 

6 

Resolved,  that  the  Third  National  Peace 
Congress  records  its  satisfaction  at  the  resolu- 
tion passed  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  calling  upon  the  President  of  the 
United  States  to  appoint  a commission  to  in- 
vestigate and  report  back  to  the  government 
the  possibilities  of  an  international  under- 


55 


standing  with  regard  to  armaments,  inter- 
national co-operation  and  new  institutions 
calculated  to  preserve  peace,  thereby  carrying 
out  the  wish  of  the  Second  National  Peace 
Congress  expressed  by  resolution.  The  Con- 
gress understands  this  Commission  to  be  a 
purely  American  Commission,  not  endowed 
with  diplomatic  functions,  and  entertains  the 
conviction  that  the  Commission  should  be  ap- 
pointed at  an  early  day  and  should  begin  its 
labors  without  regard  to  the  opinion  which 
other  powers  may  entertain  as  to  possible 
results. 

7 

Resolved,  that  this  Congress  urges  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  to  enter  upon 
negotiations  with  other  powers  looking  to  the 
formation  of  a league  of  peace  planned  simply 
to  settle  by  amicable  means  all  questions  of 
whatever  nature  which  may  arise  between  the 
contracting  powers,  with  no  idea  of  the  em- 
ployment of  force  to  impose  the  will  of  the 
league  on  any  of  its  members,  nor  to  force  any 
outside  power  to  join  the  league  nor  to  force 


56 


any  outside  power  to  arbitrate  a dispute,  nor 
to  enforce  the  decision  of  an  international 
tribunal  of  any  character,  nor  to  use  force  in 
any  other  way.  The  successful  conduct  of 
such  a league  would  be  greatly  promoted  by 
annual  conventions  which  would  serve  the 
double  purpose  of  resolving  difficulties  that 
may  have  arisen  between  members  of  the 
league  during  the  year  and  of  formulating  in- 
ternational practice. 

8 

Resolved,  that  this  Congress  congratulates 
the  governments  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  on  the  successful  settlement  by 
arbitration  of  the  Newfoundland  Fisheries  dis- 
pute, a case  which  diplomacy  had  vainly  at- 
temped  to  settle  for  the  greater  part  of  a 
century;  and  that  the  Congress  points  to  this 
case  as  a striking  example  of  the  usefulness  of 
the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  at  the 
Hague. 

9 

WHEREAS,  this  Congress  views  with  con- 
cern the  heavy  burden  imposed  on  civilized 


57 


nations  by  armaments  and  especially  their  con- 
tinued increase  despite  the  growing  sentiment 
in  favor  of  the  amicable  settlement  of  inter- 
national disputes,  be  it 

Resolved,  that  this  Congress  favors,  not  a 
spasmodic,  but  a continuous  study  of  the  limi- 
tation of  armaments  by  official  commissions 
of  the  various  governments  interested. 

io 

Resolved,  that  this  Congress  calls  attention 
to  the  importance  of  an  early  determination 
of  the  measures  to  be  brought  before  the  Third 
Hague  Conference  in  order  that  opportunity 
may  be  given  for  such  thorough  preliminary 
study  by  the  governments  interested  that  the 
delegates  to  the  Conference  may  come  with 
full  knowledge  of  the  subjects  to  be  discussed. 

n 

Resolved,  that  this  Congress  expresses  to 
Mr.  Edwin  Ginn  its  profound  gratitude  for  his 
munificent  contributions  to  the  cause  of  peace. 


58 


12 


Resolved,  that  this  Congress  expresses  to 
Mr.  Andrew  Carnegie  its  profound  gratitude 
for  his  munificent  contributions  to  the  cause  of 
peace. 

13 

WHEREAS,  there  has  been  a manifest  need 
for  a central  representative  body  which  shall 
serve  to  co-ordinate  the  efforts  of  all  the 
societies  in  America  devoted  to  the  settlement 
of  international  disputes  by  methods  other 
than  war,  as  emphasized  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States  at  the  opening  session  of 
this  Congress,  therefore  be  it 
Resolved,  that  this  body  of  delegates  de- 
clare that  this  National  Peace  Congress  shall 
hereafter  be  known  as  the  American  Peace 
Congress,  that  it  shall  be  a permanent  institu- 
tion which  shall  meet  once  in  two  years,  and 
that  while  the  Congress  is  not  in  session  its 
Executive  Committee  shall  be  charged  with 
all  the  powers  of  the  Congress,  provided  that 
said  Executive  Committee  shall  have  power  to 


59 


reorganize  by  enlarging  its  numbers  so  as  to 
become  representative  and  after  its  reorgani- 
zation shall  elect  its  own  chairman.  And 
be  it  further 

Resolved,  that  said  Committee  shall  adopt 
a form  of  organization  which  will  enable  it  to 
act  as  a clearing  house  for  all  the  societies  rep- 
resented at  this  Congress. 

14 

WHEREAS,  the  demand  that  our  own  citi- 
zens abroad  receive  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws,  and  that  persons  guilty  of  violating 
their  personal  or  property  rights  be  punished, 
is  weakened  by  the  inability  of  the  Federal 
Government  of  the  United  States,  under  the 
law,  to  punish  similar  offenses  against  for- 
eigners within  its  borders,  and 

WHEREAS,  the  absence  of  such  power  has 
been  a cause  of  friction  in  the  past  and  is  likely 
to  give  rise  to  difficulties  in  future,  therefore 
be  it 

Resolved,  that  the  Third  National  Peace 
Congress  urges  upon  the  United  States  Con- 


60 


gress  early  attention  to  the  recommendation 
of  President  Taft  for  the  enactment  of  laws 
which  will  confer  upon  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment the  power  to  fulfill  its  treaty  obligations 
in  this  respect. 

15 

Resolved,  that  this  Congress  favors  the  sug- 
gestion that  nations  should  prevent,  as  far  as 
possible,  loans  being  raised  by  their  subjects 
or  citizens  in  order  to  enable  foreign  nations 
to  carry  on  war.  And  be  it  further 

Resolved,  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  be  requested  to  include  this 
question  in  the  program  of  the  Third  Hague 
Conference. 

16 

WHEREAS,  international  controversies 
have  frequently  arisen  out  of  disputed  bound- 
aries, and 

WHEREAS,  precise  geographic  delimita- 
tion would  remove  from  the  field  of  contro- 
versy a very  disturbing  element,  this  Congress 
is  of  the  opinion  that  the  precise  delimitation 


61 


of  the  boundaries  of  American  states  would 
be  in  the  interest  of  international  peace,  and 

WHEREAS,  the  North  and  Baltic  Sea  Con- 
ventions establishing  the  territorial  status  quo 
of  those  regions  have  proved  the  practicability 
of  insuring  territorial  integrity  by  such  means, 
therefore  be  it 

Resolved,  that  this  Congress  calls  to  the  at- 
tention of  the  United  States  Government  the 
advisability  of  including  within  the  program 
of  the  Fifth  International  American  Confer- 
ence proposals  to  establish  an  international 
commission  for  the  delimitation  of  the  bound- 
aries of  the  states  of  the  two  Americas  and 
for  the  conclusion  of  a convention  which  shall 
maintain  the  integrity  of  the  boundaries  so 
delimitated. 

17 

Resolved,  that  in  order  to  enable  the  Execu- 
tive and  Judicial  departments  of  our  govern- 
ment fully  to  discharge  the  international 
duties  of  the  United  States  a thorough  revision 
of  the  neutrality  laws  of  the  United  States 
should  be  made. 


62 


i8 


Resolved,  that  the  hearty  thanks  of  this 
Congress  be  extended  to  the  Johns  Hopkins 
University  for  its  very  great  hospitality. 


6 3 


Ammratt  for  iluJiiftal  ^rttlrmrnt 

of  Sltttrntaliottal  disputes 

The  printed  proceedings  of  the  Conference 
of  the  American  Society  for  Judicial  Settle- 
ment of  International  Disputes,  Washington, 
December  15-17,  1910,  which  furnished  the 
occasion  for  the  memorable  utterance  of  Presi- 
dent William  Howard  Taft  on  the  subject  of 
an  all-inclusive  treaty  of  arbitration,  are  now 
ready. 

The  collection  of  addresses  will  be  found  of 
great  importance.  They  throw  light  on 
present  day  problems  of  an  international  char- 
acter, containing  most  interesting  historical 
reviews  of  certain  aspects  of  internationalism 
and  a profound  study  of  law  and  courts  which 
will  give  the  book  permanent  value. 

The  discussion  centered  largely  upon  the 
proposed  international  court  of  justice,  an  idea 
which  has  been  the  hope  of  leading  thinkers 


64 


of  the  world  for  many  generations  and  which 
it  is  confidently  believed  we  are  on  the  eve  of 
realizing. 

The  discussions  were  participated  in  by 
such  statesmen,  educators  and  men  of  affairs 
as: 


President  Taft 
Hon.  Simeon  E.  Baldwin 
Hon.  Richard  Bartholdt 
Justice  Henry  B.  Brown 
Andrew  Carnegie 
Hon.  Joseph  H.  Choate 
Hon.  Wm.  Bourke  Cockran 
Chas.  W.  Eliot 
Hon.  John  W.  Foster 
Hon.  Wm.  Dudley  Foulke 
The  French  Ambassador 
James  Cardinal  Gibbons 
Edwin  Ginn 

Major-General  Frederick  D. 

Grant,  U.  S.  A. 

Chas.  Noble  Gregory 
Francis  W.  Hirst 
David  Starr  Jordan 
Frederick  N.  Judson 
Harry  Pratt  Judson 
Hon.  Martin  W.  Littleton 


Hon.  Francis  B.  Loomis 
Hon.  Henry  B.  F.  Macfarland 
Frederic  D.  McKenney 
The  Mexican  Ambassador 
Hon.  Andrew  J.  Montague 
The  Minister  of  the  Nether- 
lands 

Thomas  Nelson  Page 
Jackson  H.  Ralston 
Justice  William  Renwick  Rid- 
dell 

Hon.  Elihu  Root 
James  Brown  Scott 
Alp'neus  H.  Snow 
Rear-Admiral  Chas.  H.  Stock- 
ton 

Hon.  Oscar  S.  Straus 
Eugene  Wambaugh 
Benjamin  Ide  Wheeler 
General  Stewart  L.  Woodford 


They  suggest  in  a comprehensive  way  the 
immeasurable  direct  advantages  which  would 
accrue  from  the  establishment  of  a court,  to- 
gether with  certain  collateral  results  such  as 
the  upbuilding  of  international  law.  Such 


65 


growth  of  law  would  follow  as  a result  of  the 
decisions  of  the  court  and  as  a result  further 
of  the  codification  of  certain  spheres  of  inter- 
national law  which  would  be  invited  by  the 
very  existence  of  such  a court. 

The  volume  will  be  found  useful  as  a book 
of  reference  for  those  who  have  occasion  to 
treat  this  subject  in  an  essay  or  address  at  any 
time.  It  will  be  found  particularly  valuable 
for  students  of  international  questions. 

Price,  bound  in  paper,  $1.00. 

WILLIAMS  & WILKINS  COMPANY, 

2427  York  Road,  Baltimore,  Md. 


66 


Attteriratt  ©nrtetg  for  Jitbirial  g'ctttrmrnt  of 
international  Disputes 
©Surra 

Honorary  President,  William  Howard  Taft. 

President,  John  Hays  Hammond, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Vice-President,  Simeon  E.  Baldwin, 

Hartford,  Conn. 

Secretary,  Theodore  Marburg, 

Baltimore,  Md. 

Treasurer,  J.  G.  Schmidlapp, 

Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Life  membership,  $100;  Sustaining  membership,  $10  a year; 
Annual  membership,  $i  a year. 

Remit  to  treasurer,  J.  G.  Schmidlapp,  Cincinnati,  U.S.A.  Address 
inquiries  to  secretary,  Theodore  Marburg,  Baltimore,  U.  S.  A. 

The  proceedings  of  the  “Judicial  Settlement”  Conference  at 
Washington,  December  13-17.  1910,  will  be  printed  in  English, 
French,  German  and  Spanish.  Each  member  of  the  Society  will 
be  entitled  to  one  copy.  Non-members  may  procure  them  for 
One  Dollar  a copy. 

Additional  copies  of  this  or  other  issues  of  the  Judicial  Settle- 
ment Quarterly  may  be  obtained  without  charge  from  the  As- 
sistant Secretary, 

TUNSTALL  SMITH, 

The  Preston,  Baltimore,  U.  S.  A. 


A turn  run  ©oriEtg  fnr  Jufc'trfal  Srttlrmrnt  nf 
Ilnternatinnal  Siaputra 

AJiuisori}  (Council 

Lyman  Abbott,  New  York. 

Edwin  A.  Alderman,  Virginia. 

James  B.  Angell,  Michigan. 

Simeon  E.  Baldwin,  Connecticut. 

Richard  Bartholdt,  Missouri. 

Alexander  Graham  Bell,  Washington,  D.  C. 

R.  L.  Borden,  Ottawa,  Ont. 

Theodore  E.  Burton,  Ohio. 

Joaquin  D.  Casasus,  Mexico  City,  Mexico. 

George  E.  Chamberlain,  Oregon. 

Winston  Churchill,  New  Hampshire. 

George  B.  Cutten,  Wolfville,  N.  S. 

William  R.  Day,  Ohio. 

Jacob  M.  Dickinson,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Andrew  S.  Draper,  New  York. 

Charles  W.  Eliot,  Massachusetts. 

Charles  E.  Fenner,  Louisiana. 

William  Dudley  Foulke,  Indiana. 

James  Cardinal  Gibbons,  Maryland. 

George  Gray,  Delaware. 

Charles  Noble  Gregory,  Iowa. 

Peter  S.  Grosscup,  Illinois. 

Joseph  F.  Johnston,  Alabama. 

David  Starr  Jordan,  California. 

Harry  Pratt  Judson,  Illinois. 

William  H.  King,  Utah. 

George  W.  Kirchwey,  New  York. 

Philander  C.  Knox,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Charles  F.  Libby,  Maine. 

Francis  B.  Loomis,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Horace  H.  Lurton,  Tennessee. 

R.  McBride,  Victoria,  B.  C. 

Pablo  Macedo,  Mexico  City,  Mexico. 

Charles  Marcil,  Ottawa,  Ont. 


Sidney  E.  Mezes,  Texas. 

S.  C.  Mitchell,  South  Carolina. 

Francis  G.  Newlands,  Nevada. 

L.  Oppenheim,  Cambridge,  England. 

Thomas  Nelson  Page,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Walter  H.  Page,  New  York. 

W.  Peterson,  Montreal. 

Sir  Thomas  Raleigh,  London,  England. 
Whitelaw  Reid,  London,  England. 

William  Renwick  Riddell,  Toronto,  Ont. 

Uriah  M.  Rose,  Arkansas. 

A.  C.  Rutherford,  Edmonton,  Alberta. 

Walter  Scott,  Regina,  Saskatchewan. 

Albert  Shaw,  New  York. 

Hoke  Smith,  Georgia. 

Bishop  Robert  Strange,  North  Carolina. 

Sir  Charles  Hibbert  Tupper,  Vancouver,  B.  C. 
George  Turner,  Washington. 

Charles  R.  Van  Hise,  Wisconsin. 

Benjamin  Ide  Wheeler,  California. 

William  Allen  White,  Kansas. 

George  G.  Wilson,  Rhode  Island. 

Prince  de  Cassano,  Italy. 


